Volume 4

Issue 1

1-1900

The Forum - Volume 4, Issue 4

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/forum

Recommended Citation
The Forum - Volume 4, Issue 4, 4 DICK. L. REV. 73 (2020).
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/forum/vol4/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in The Forum by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more information, please
contact lja10@psu.edu.

THE FORUM.
Vol. IV

JANUARY, 190D.

No. 4

Pnblished Monthly by the Students of

THE DICKINSON SCHOOL OF LAW,
CARLISLE, PA.
EDITORS.
OLTIVER LENTZ, (Chairman).
WILLIAbc T.

STA-uFPER,

LAWRENCE M.

SEBRING,

FLOYD

L,.

HESS,

SARA McBRDE MIARVRL.

BUSINESS MANAGERS.
WILSON S. ROTHERMEL,

SAMUEL E. BASEHORE, (Chairman).
HOWARD M. HARPEL,

W. BROOKR YZAORR.

Subscription, $1.25 per Annum.
Address all Communications to
THE FORUM, CARLISLE, PA.

TO ALUMNM

LECTURE BY JUDGE BIDDLE.

The editors solicit from the Alumni generally any news items concerning graduates of this school. We particularly solicit
information of appointment or election to
public office, retention on civil or criminal
cases of great importance, commendatory
newspaper clippings,--anything in short
that you feel your classmates would be
pleased to know of one another.
The Alumni, as arule, must be very busy
or quite unconscious of any further duty
toward or interest in Alma Mater. This
we deduce from the fact that we have received as many as three unsolicited contributions to the Alumni column during
the past year.
Alumni Notes, as a department of the
FORUM, depends for the degree of its interest upon Alumni. It is easily seen that a
local board is entirely dependant upon
three sources for information of this nature. We have: First, the rumor of the
School; second, solicited news; third, unsolicited contributions. The first is precarious and unreliable, the second means
too much work for student editors, and the
third, gentlemen, rests with you. We
hope you will aid us to make this column
of interest to your fellow graduates, and
consequently, a success.

On Friday evening, January 19th, Judge
Biddle, of the Ninth Judicial District, delivered a lecture to the Law School, by request of the Dickinson Society.
The Judge having been introduced by
Mr. Valentine, president of the Allison
Society, he delivered a most practical lecture on "Practice in the Orphans' Court."
He opened his lecture by giving a short
history of the Orphans' Court from the
time of its creation, during the colonial
days of Pennsylvania, down to the present
time. He then took an actual case in his
former legal practice, a case of great intricacy, and one in which many points of law
arose, and with it traced the practice in
the court from its inception to its completion. Along the line he gave very valuable information to the Law students in
the making of an inventory, the filing of
an account, and its auditing. Another interesting fact in this case was the fact that
the personalty was insufficient to pay the
debts. This gave him an opportunity to
show how a petition for the sale of realty is
made and presented to the court, and how
the sale of such property is consummated.
In short he gave the students a very
good idea of the settling of an estatesomethingof very great value to thosewho
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are about to practice the law. It is the
hearty wish of all the students that they
may shortly be again entertained and instructed by the Judge of this District.

President-HoratioRussell.
Vice-President-W. H. Taylor.
Secretary-Aaron Light.
Critic-Harry M. Collins.

ATHLETICS.

DICKINSON SOCIETY.

The Law School basketball team defeated a team chosen from the College on
Saturday, January 30th, by the score of
19 to 17. The game was very hotly contested, the College team being composed
of men who were in training, while the
Law team had only two men who were in
fit wind and condition. The following
were the Law School players: Taylor
(captain), MIcGuffie, Gillespie, Hess,
Adamson, and Rothermel, who took
Adamson's place in the second half. The
'Varsity will play Bucknell on January
27th.

The Christmas intermission has done
nothing to weaken the zeal and earnestness of the members of the Dickinson Society. Nay, more, these few weeks of vacation have if possible increased the interest of the members in the welfare of
their society. At no time in the history
of the society has there been such complete
harmony-such an utter lack of factional
feeling-as exists at present. The members geem to have but one object, the welfare of their organization.
The last program consisted of a debate
on the question, "Resolved, That the signs
of the times indicate the downfall of our
Government." Messrs. Shellenberger and
Buck very creditably upheld the affirmativeof this proposition, while Messrs. Trude
and Stauffer spoke no less ably on the
negative. Mr. H. L. Henderson entertained the society by a very eloquent oration on the "United States in relation to
the Philippine Islands."
The incoming President gave at our last
meeting an inaugural address of great
merit, filled, as it was, with sound advice
and earnest exhortation that every member do his best. He appointed Messrs.
Winlack, O'Keefe and Trude as members
of the executive committee.
The newly-elected officers who took their
positions at the last meeting are:
President-HaroldP. Katz.
Vice-President-ArthurW. Mitchell.
Secretary-Michael J. Ryan.
Treasurer-W.Ernest Shaffer.
Sergeant-at-Arms-RobertH. Moon.
Sheriff-Wencel Hartman, Jr.
DistrictAttorney-John B. Lavens.
Clerk of Court-William H. Points.
Constable-W. Burt Riley.
Prothonotary-JohnN. Minnich.
Register of Wills-Harry J. Shellenberger.
Warden-Charles C. Sloan.

Lorrie R. Holcomb, President of the
Musical Association, and first tenor on the
Glee Club, was unable to accompany the
club on its holiday tour owing to a severe
cold and threatened attack of pneumonia.
A. W. Mitchell led in the absence of Prof.
Bland, who was also ill.
DELTA CHI FRATERNITY.
The affairs of the fraternity are in a
most prosperous condition. Thefifthman
selected from the junior class, Robert K.
MacConnell, of Saltsburg, Indiana Co.,
Pa., was initiated at a recent meeting.
WEORCAN CLUB.
The Weorcan Club has now passed
through the first administration since its
organization - an administration which
every one pronounces a veritable success,
and from which every imember has gained
a fairer acquaintance with English Literature.
The Club will at the next meeting begin
a careful perusal of Shakespeare's Hamlet,
and in its succeeding meetings will slowly,
but thoroughly, complete its reading of
that work.
At the first meeting after the holidays
the following persons were elected officers
of the Club:

All students were pleased to notice a new
set of Pennsylvania Reports in the library
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on their return from the Christmas vacation.
The school has secured three new students since the holidays. They are Messrs.
Kemp, from Hazleton; Talbot, from Alden, and Conrey, from Shenandoah.
The Middle class began work on the
subject of Agency on January 10th.

tion in the district attorney's office in
Philadelphia. He will not return to
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Frank T. Morrow, '97, left Tyrone to
take the position of general manager of the
Pennsylvania Building and Loan Association at Johnstown, Pa.

It is encouraging to note that, with the
beginning of the new term, .increased
interest centers in the society work.
Looking back over the past term's work,
we feel that our society has been continually progressing. The officers have been
most efficient, and especial credit is due
the executive committee for the pleasing
arrangement and successful management
of the various programs.
During the month the following propositions have been debated:
Dec. 1.-esolved, That capital punishment should be abolished.
Dec. 8.-Resolved, That Dewey did not
exercise'good judgment in transferring his
home to his wife.
Jan. 12.-Reaolved, That' the rule in
Shelley's case should be abolished.
Mr. Cisney's name has been added to our
list of members.
At the meeting on January 12th, the
following officers were elected:
President-Valentine.
Vice-President-Harpel.
Seretary-Elmes.
Treasure-Adamson.
Executive Committee-Barr,Prince and
Lentz.
ALUMNI NOTES.
Garrett B. Stevens,'99, and Charles Shatiser, '98, wereadmitted to the Berks county
bar on Dec. 23, 1899. The fact that they

had both been in the army weighed heavily
in securing them an examination at an
unusual time.
B. Johnston MacEwen, 199, was in Carlisle for a few days this month.
Wencel Hartman, Jr., '99, who had re-

turned to take. the three-year diploma,
secured a very desirableand lucrative posi-

Carlisle.

E. L. Ryan, '97, is the Republican candidate for burgess of Kane, McKean county. Kane is a progressive borough, and
the site of a number of large industrial enterprises, having a population of over six
thousand.

E. Gregg Brotherlin, '96, has accepted a
position with the Carnegie Steel Co.
R. A. Henderson, '94, has become prominent as one of the leading criminal lawyers in Blair county. He is a member of
the bar committee and examining board
of the county.

Harry Savidge, '97, son of Hon. C. R.
Savidge, of Sunbury, succeeded in shooting a 200 pound black bear recently near
Highland Lake.
Charles -C. Greer, '93, of Johnstown,
Cambria Co., has a very large practice.
In addition to his ordinary business he
holds the office of city solicitor.
Andrew J. Lynch, 193, of Georgetown,
Delaware, was married during the holidays to a lady from North Carolina.
W. Harrison Walker, '96, is spoken of
as the probable nominee of the Demo-.
cratic party for burgess of Bellefonte,
Centre Co. The election of a Democratic
candidate is probable.
In December last Reese, '99, was admited to the Luzerne County Bar after a successful examination.
THE INTER-SOCIETY DEBATE.
The Inter-Society debate, at any rate in
the immediate future, will not take place.
Some of the agreements between the committees have been violated, and there
seems to be lacking both willingness to
waive trivialities and the desire to meet in
a contest.
This is unfortunate. In neither of the
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societies is the work so well done that it
could not easily be done better. Zeal is
lacking, and both societies would profit
from the increased earnestness and-activity
which would be the result of a pending
contest between them. As for the individual contestants, it is certainly not too
much to say that they would be urged to
the exertion of their full abilities by the
stimulus of appearing publicly as the
champions of their respective societies, by
the fear of defeat and by the desire for
victory. For six men, at least, the expeperience would be highly beneficial. The
members as a whole would also be benefited. In the first place, there would be
debating contests for the privilege of representing the society. In the second place,
theoccasion would awaken the partisan
spirit on both sides, and the result would
be a vast increase in active rivalry, and
consequently an increase in the interest
taken in the work of both societies.
Thirdly, the custom once established,
there would probably be more debatesThe beaten party would put forth every
exertion to so improve its work that it
should win in future, and the victors would
be put to continuous exertion to maintain
their position. That rivalry, a live and
immediate object, would be a stronger incentive to effort in our societies than the
ultimate, though vague, goal of "improvement in public speaking," is hardly to be
doubted.
The friends of this school, we are sure,
will regret that these negotiations have
now for the second time been broken. We
believe that we express their wishes when
we say that we hope to see this matter
again taken up and arrangements made,
not only for a debate this year, but for
yearly debates in the future.
REPLACING BOOKS IN THE
LIBRARY.
There is a movement on foot to consider
some plan for getting the men to return
the books to their shelves in the library
after they have been used.
Anyone bringing about such a desirable
innovation will deserve the hearty thanks
of the present aud of future generations of
students. We have all made those tours

of the tables, pawing over pile upon pile
of books that lie every-which-way, looking
at anywhere from fifty to two hundred
numbers, and then starting the round
again until we finally found the book we
were after on the seat of a chair under the
table. Was it pleasant? or instructive?
or calculated to make one love one's fellowmen?
The man who will. for the sake of the
slight trohble he can thereby save himself,
leave his books lying about the library,
and compel a balf-dozen men to hunt high
and low for them, iaso ingrainedly selfish
and inconsiderateof all his fellow-students
that he deserves no more consideration
from them than they give to any other
nuisance. Most of the men, seeing their
own advantage, will readily agree and
carry out an agreement to replace the
books they use. The few who will not
should be coerced.
The businessmanagers of the Microcosm
for the Law School have been circulating
subscription blanks among the students
during the past week. They have already
secured the names of a large number of the
men.

MOOT COURT.
HARRIS vs. FIRE INSURANCE CO.
Fire insurance-Stipulation against vacancy-Notices of vacancy.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Harris obtained from defendant a policy
on his barn and house, on a farm in tfie
possession of a tenant, for $3,000. The
policy stated that the company would not
be liable for loss by fire that occurred
during any vacancy of the house, unless
prompt notice of such vacancy be given to
the company, and its assent thereto be
given in writing. The tenant unexpectedly moved from the premises on Sept. 4,
1898. Harris, residing fourmiles off, heard
of the removal on Sept. 5, 1898. He then
telegraphed to the agent of the company
in Harrisburg, but the message failed to
reach him. Hearing nothing from him,
Harris telegraphed again, on Sept. 6th.
The message was received, and the agent
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wrote the same evening to the office of the
company in Philadelphia, where, on Sept.
7th, the letter was received. The agent in
Philadelphia, on Sept. 8th, wrote to the
Harrisburg agent, refusing the permission.
On the night of Sept. 7th the barn was
destroyed, the loss being S1,400. A tenant
was procured for the house in a few days,
aud three months afterwards afire occurred
in the house, doing S500 damage. "Assumpsitfor both losses."
KAT Z and KERN for the plaintiff.
1. The insured is held strictly to the
terms of the contract, and thir being a vacancy within the meaning of the contract,
he cannot recover. McClure v. Ins. Co.,
90 Pa 277; Sonneborn v. Ins. Co., 44 N.J.
L. 220 (Definition of vacancy); Ashworth
v. Ins. Co., 112 Nlass. 422.
FRANK and DoUGHERTY for the defend-

ant.
1. To excuse the company, there must
be either (a) lack of reasonable notice of
vacancy, or (b) refusal by the company,
after notice, to continue the policy during
vacancy. There was reasonable notice,
and the fire took place before withdrawal
of insurance. Strunk v. Ins. Co., 160 Pa.
345; Roe v. Ins. Co., 149 Pa. 94.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The policy issued by the defendant covered the house and barn of the plaintiff for
the period of a year. A fire destroyed the
barn on Sept. 7, 1898, the loss being $1,400,
and three months afterwards, during the
term of the policy, the house was damaged
by fire to the extent of $500.
The policy stated that the company
would "not be liable for loss by fire that
occurs during any vacancy of the house,
unless prompt notice of such vacancy be
given to the company, and its assent
thereto be given in writing." Similar
stipulations are frequent, and their validity
is unquestionable. Weareconcerned simply to know the meaning of the policy,
and whether, in this meaning, there was a
vacancy without prompt notice, and without assent.
The policy is not avoided by a vacancy
of the premises during its term. Its security is simply withdrawn during that
vacancy. For a fire that occurs during it,
the company refuses to be liable. *Whatever, therefore, may be the effect of the
vacation of the house on the liability of
the defendant for the damage to the barn,
it cannot impair the right of the plaintiff

to recover for the loss to the house, for the
fire that produced that loss occurred while
it was occupied.
Nor can it be contended that when a
policy covers various pieces of property for
a year, damage to one of these pieces by a
fire dissolves the policy, so that it ceases
to operate for the res due of the term with
respect to the other pieces. Payment by
the company, even for the first loss, would
not have that result. Trull v. Roxbury
Mut. F. Ins. Co., 3 Cush. 263; 1 Biddle,
Ins., 594. No adequate defense to the
claim for $500 has been suggested.
The injury to the barn occurred during
the vacancy of the house, and if vacancy
alone suspended the policy, there could for
it be no recovery. But, it is not vacancy
alone that thus suspends. It is vacancy,
without prompt notice to the company, or
with prompt notice, and refusal of the
company in writing to assent. Was there
prompt notice? The tenant's removal was
unexpected. It was not learned by the
plaintiff till the following day. He instantly telegraphed to the agent. He
waited till the next day, without hearing
from the agent, when he again telegraphed, and the message was this time
received. We are of opinion that it was
not improper to allow the jury to find, on
this evidence, that "prompt notice ' of the
vacancy had been given.
The-policy stipulates that it shall be
suspended, unless prompt notfce be given,
andthe company's assent to theivacancy be
given in writing. The suspension, however, does not begin until either too longa
delay in giving the notice has occurred, or,
the notice being prompt, until the refusal
of the company to assent. If there is
prompt notice, the policy remains operative
untilsuch refusal. Strunk v. Ins. Co., 160
Pa. 345. On Sept. 8th the agent in Philadelphia wrote to the Harrisburg agent, refusing the permissibn, but the fire had already
occurred on the night of Sept. 7th ; had
occurred, that is, before the protection of
the policy had been suspended. The subsequent dissent could not retroact.
As it appears, therefore, that no error
was committed in the instruction of the
Court to the jury, a new trial must be refused.
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LOUIS JORDAN vs. JOHN PRICE.
Contract-,Promise- Warranty.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Jordan contracted to let Price take possession of his peach farm and cultivate it
for 10 years, and Price agreed to pay
Jordan 20 cents a bushel for every bushel
of peaches raised and sold, and that he
would sell enough to make the compensa'tion to Jordan equal to at least $300 per
year. He paid Jordan $425 the first, and
$317 the second year. The third year the
entire crop was destroyed by frost, and the
fourth year the crop produced was sold for
only $225. Price, discouraged, then "threw
up" the farm, Jordan accepting the surrender. This is an action for $600, the
rental of the third and fourth years.
KATZ and LIGHTNER for plaintiff.

1. The promise of defendant was an
absolute warranty and the frost will not
excuse payment of all rent. Dyer &
Wigletmary, 66 Pa. St. 427; "Rights and
Remedies," Book 5, page 4173; School Dist.
v. Dauchy, 2.5 Conn. 530 Adams v. Nichols, 36 Mass. 276; Harnony v. Brigher, 12
N. Y. 99.
McDONALD and SEBRING for defendant.

1. The subject matter, the productiveness of the orchard, has been destroyed;
therefore, defendant is excused from payment. Howell v. Coupland: L. R. 9 Q. B.
462; Ward v. Vance, 93 Pa St. 499; Lovering v. The Buck Mountain Coal Co., 54
Pa. St. 291.
2. "Any event which human skill could
not have prevented or human judgment
foreseen, will excuse performance." "Am.
and Eng. Enc. of Law" (See. Ed.) Vol. I,
page 590.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

This case turns upon the interpretation
of the contract between plaintiff and defendant. It iscontended on behalf of the
plaintiff that the engagement of the defendant "that he would sell enough to
make the compensation to Jordan equal
to at least $'00i
per year" amounted to an
absolute promise to pay a rent of at least
$300 per year. We are convinced that such
was not the intention of the parties. If
the terms of the contract had been that
defendant was to pay $300 per annum for
the land, and in addition thereto a percentage from the income of the peach
yield above a certain amount, the intention would have clearly appeared that the

defendant assumed the risk of a failure of
the crop, and that $300 per annum was to
be paid without regard to the defendant's
profits or losses. The same view might
with reason be taken, if the defendant
had expressly agreed to pay 20 cents on
every bushel sold, and in case the crop in
any year should be so light that the payment of 20 cents per bushel would not
amount to $300, to make up the deficiency.
But the language actually used in the
contract before us-"that he would sell
enough to make the compensation to Jordan equal to at least $300 per year' '-clearly indicates that the defendant engaged,
not to guarantee absolutely a minimum
rent of $300 per year, but merely to use
every effort to prevent the yield from
falling below a certain point;,and that
subject to that condition, the plaintiff
assumed the risk of a failure of the crop.
There are several cases in this State,
arising out of the leasing of land for
mining purposes, which strongly support
our conclusion. In one of them, Muhlenberg v. Henning, 116 Pa. 138, it appeared
that the lessees covenanted to pay 35 cents
per ton for every ton of merchantable iron
ore mined and to mine at least 1500 tons
annually, or in default thereof to pay a
royalty of $59-5 annually. In an action to
recover unpaid royalties for two years, the
defendants filed an affidavit of defense
averring that though they had operated
the mines in a workmanlike and skillful
manner for about nine months, yet, on account of the non-existence of sufficient
merchantable ore, they were unable to
continue. The court held that the defense
was a good one, Mr. Justice Clark saying:
"We are not to construe the contract to require the lessees to perform an impossible
thing. The $5125 is not a penalty, it is the
price of the ore. The grant was of the ore
in place, and if the subject matter of the
contract fail, the price is not payable.
If there was no ore to mine there could be
no royalty to pay." So in the case at bar,
the $300 is not a penalty, it is the price of
peaches, and if the defendant is prevented
by causes beyond his control from selling
peaches, the price is not payable. See
also Kemble Coal and Tron Co. v. Scott,
15 W. N. C. 220; McCahan v. Wharton,
121 Pa. 424: Bannan v. Graeff, 186 Pa. 648;
Boyer v. Fulmer, 176 Pa. 282. The case
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The first was owned by his brother-in-law,
who obtained ajudgment on his mortgage,
issued a levari facias and sold the same.
His intention when buying the land was
subsequently to reconvey the property to
Heil, which he did two years after in 1895.
The holder of the second mortgage upon
the farm, after the reconveyance to Heil,
JOSHUA LIPPINCOTT vs. ABRAM
issued a levari facias and the land was
HEIL.
again ,jold, this time to the plaintiff, who
now brings this action in ejectment to seEjectment--Fraudulent Sale-Preference
cure possession of the property.
of First Mortgage.
It is true "that if the first sale was
fraudulent then the purchaser under the
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
second acquired the title of the defendant
Heil in 1893 made a mortgage for $3,000
in the execution, and, as to both him, and
upon his farm to William Bulwer; in 1894
the purchaser at the first and fraudulent
another for $2,500 to Samuel Baker, and
sale, is entitled to recover." Page v.
subsequently judgments amounting to
Simpson, 172 Pa. 288.
$7,000 were obtained against him, and beBut was the first sale fraudulent? The
came liens. Buwer, his brother-in-law,
only
ground for so stating is found in the
decided to obtain judgment on the mortfact that the purchaser intended to recongage, and sell the land, so as to divest the
vey the property at some future time to
liens. The judgment sur mortgage was
his brother-in-law, and that the price reobtained, and a sale made, at which
ceived for the property was $2,200, whereBulwer became the purchaser ; intending,
as at private sale it would have brought
when Hell obtained a discharge in bank$5,000. What the future intention of
ruptcy, to convey the premises to him,
Bulwer was can have no effect.
and take a mortgage for the sum paid.
But it is urged that the price received
Bulwer paid $2,200 for the farm, which, at
was inadequate. Objection on this ground,
a private sale, would have brought $5,000.
even if valid, should have been made by a
Two years after Bulwer conveyed the farm
petition to court asking for a rule to show
to Hell, receiving a mortgage for $2,200
cause why the sale should notbe set aside.
from the latter. Baker then issued a
But even had this been done, the adjudilevari facias on the judgment he had obcated cases clearly hold that this would
tained on his mortgage, and the land was
have not been sufficient ground, if the sale
again sold to Lippincott. Ejectment.
was regular and no fraud is shown to have
RYAN and O' KEEFE for plaintiff.
been practiced, and none does appear in
1. If the first sale is fraudulent then
the case at bar.
the purchaser under the second acquired
Cake v. Cake, 156 Pa. 47 ; Hollister v.
the title of the defendant in the execution,
Vanderlin, 165 Pa. 248; Felton v. Felton,
and, as to both him, and the purchaer at
the first fraudilent sale, is still entitled to
175 Pa. 44.
recover. Page v. Simpson, 172 Pa. St.
Judgment must, therefore, be entered
288.
2. Sheriff's return is conclusive of for the defendant.
of Timlin v. Brown, 158 Pa. 606, may
appear to be in conflict with those cited,
but it is very carefully distinguished in
Boyer v. Fulmer, supra, and Bannon v.
Graeff, supra.
Judgment for defendant.

plaintiff's title. Lawrence v. Pond, -17
Masq. 443; "Rights, Remedies and Practice," Vol. 7, pp. 5,805.
KENNEDY and COLLINS for defendant.
1. Sale of farm is irregular and vendee
does not take good title. Tenan v. Cain,
188 Pa. 242.
2. There is no evidence of fraud in this

CHARLES STOCKDALE vs. JAMES
HOPKINS.
Liability of hubandfor wife's necessaries
-

What are necessaries.

ease.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Abram Heil, the defendant, was owner
of a certain tract of land against which
stood several mortgages and judgments.

Hopkins' wife having frequently bought
household goods of Stockdale, against his
will, he notified Stockdale not to sell any-
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thing more to her except on his personal
authority. Two days after the wife bought
curtains for a room in the house. When
Hopkins found them he did not put them
out, nor notify Stockdale to take them
away, and his wife in due time had them
put in place. Three months afterwards
Stockdale sent the bill of $69 to Hopkins,
who refused to pay, and Stockdale brought
assumpsit. There were already a fairly
good carpet and curtains in the room,
when the curtains and carpet in suit were
ordered.
BASHORE and CLARK for plaintiff.
1. Giving notice to tradesmen will not
relieve husband from liability. McGrath
v. Donnelly, 131 Pa St. 549; Rigoney v.
Neiman, 73 Pa. St. 830.
2. Furniture, etc., have been held to be
necessaries. Hunt v. DeBlaquiere, 5 Bing.
550; "Tiffany on Domestic Relations,"
page. 126; Segelbaum v. Ensminger, 117
Pa. 248.
BUCK and HARPEL for defendant.
1. The wife is the general agent of the
husband with reference to those things
usually left to her control. Freestone v.
Butcher, 9 Car. & P. 643; Ruddock v.
Marsh, 1 Hurl. & N. 601; Washburn v.
Washburn, 9 Cal. 475.
2. Whoevei deals with such agent is
bound to know the exteat of her authority.
White v. Langdon, 30 Vt. 599.
OPINION OF THE COURT,
It is well settled that the husband is liable for necessaries furnished his wife, although notice has been given that he
would not be responsible for debts contracted by her. McGrath v. Donnelly, 131
Pa. 549; Cunningham v. Irwin, 7 S. & R.
246; Rigoney v. Neiman, 73 Pa. 332. In
the first mentioned case, Slagle, J., in
charging the jury, said: "A man, though
he has the right to notify any person with
whom his family deals that he must not
trust them, can only do so. and the notice
be effective, when he himself supplies the
necessaries that they should have; and if
he fails to supply them, then some person
else may, upon his credit."
Were the goods furnished by the plaintfff in this case to the wife of the defendant necessaries? Ordinarily, the question
is one for the jury under all the circumstances of the case. Parke v. Kleeber, 37
Pa. 251; McGrath v. Donnelly, 131 Pa.
549; Mohney v. Evans, 51 Pa. 80; Raynes
v. Bennett, 114 Mass. 424. In some cases,

however, it is the duty of the court to rule
as a matter of law that certain articles do
not, under the circumstances of the case,
come within the class of necessaries for
which a wife may pledge the credit of her
husband without his consent. Merriam v.
Cunningham, 11 Cush. 40; Tupper v. Cadwell, 12 Met. 5-59; Mohney v. Evans, 51
Pa. 80. We are convinced that it is our
duty to so rule in the case at bar. Had
there been no carpet or curtains in the
room, or had the carpet and curtains been
worn out, it would be for the jury to determine whether it was necessary, for the
comfort of the wife, that a new carpet and
new curtains be purchased by her. But it
appears that at the time of the purchase
there were already "fairly good" carpet
and curtains in the room-that is to say,
carpet and curtains which would be regarded as fairly good by persons of the
same means and social station as the defendant and his wife. This implies that
the carpet and curtains were still of respectable appearance and in serviceable
condition. Plainly, then, to purchase a
new carpet and new curtains was to indulge in a luxury. It may have been a
luxury which the defendant could well
afford; but that is not for us to determine;
nor was it for his wife or the plaintiff to
determine. So long as the defendant provid'ed his home with such furniture and
decorations as to make it, in the eyes of
persons of his own means and social position, a comfortable home, the plaintiff had
no right to furnish it with luxuries at. his
expense, especially when he had expressly
forbidden him so to do.
Admitting, then, that the articles furnished by plaintiff were not necessaries, it
remains to determine whether or not the
defendant, by permitting them to remain
in his house, ratified the purchase. The
question is answered by the decision in
Segelbaum v. Ensminger, 117 Pa. 248, a
case analogous to the one before us, where
the court declared that there was no duty
to return the goods resting upon the defendant when they were sold after express
notice not to sell them, nor to notify the
plaintiff that he must remove them, in
order to relieve the defendant from liability.
Judgment for plaintiff reversed.
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JOHN JONES vs. SAMUEL JACOBS.

Ejectment- Vested Legac1y--ight of
Illegitimate Children to Inherit.
STATEMIENT OF THE CASE.

Amos Philips left a will which contained
the following clause: "Further, I direct
that the remainder of my estate, not heretofore disposed of, be divided equally as
soon as can be done, share and share alike,
among my six sons and two daughters,
viz.: Elizabeth, widow of John Smith,
deceased, and Louisa, inter-married with
Thomas Jones; and the share or portion
coming to my daughter Louisa, the wife
of Thomas Jones, shall be taken by my
executors hereinafter named, and put out
at interest, and such interest arising therefrom shall be paid annually to my said
daughter Louisa (and not to her husband,
the said Thomos Jones) during hernaiural
life, but if my said daughter Louisa shall
desire that her portion be invested in real
estate, then my said executors, shall have
full power and authority to do so if they
find it to be to the best interest for my
daughter Louisa, and for her children, but
shall make no investment in real estate
without the consent of my daughter
Louisa, and after her decease, her share or
portion shall be divided equally amongst
her children, share and share alike."
The share of Louisa, by her consent, was
invested in real estate, and remained so
until her death, and still remains so.
The testator died in 1883. Louisa and
five sons (one an illegitimate child) were
living at the time of the testator's death.
One of these legitimate children died in
1885. The illegitimate child died in 1897,
leaving a widow and two children-a
daughter and a son. This sonalso died in
1898, but after his grandmother Louisa.
Louisa died in 1898, survived by three
sons and the widow and daughter of the
illegitimate son.
Samuel Jacobs is in the possession of the
real estate without right, and John Jones
brings this ejectment for an undivided
third of the land.
RYAN and SEBRING for plaintiff.
1. "Children" must be construed as
meaning "legitimate children." Appell
v. Byers, 98 Pa. St. 480; Am. & Eng. Ec.
of Law, (Sec. Ed ) Vol. 5, page 1,095.

2. The bastard son could not inherit
from his mother, for he had died a year
preceding her death. Steckel's Appeal,
64 Pa. 493.
MITCHELL

and

MILLER

for defendant.

1. The mother inherited the share of
the legitimate son by his death in 1885.
Act of April 8, 1833.
2. One-fourth of this share would descend to her illegitimate son at her death.
Act of April 27, 1855.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The will of Amos Philips treats his
personalty as containing six shares, and
directs these shares to be equally divided
among "my six sons and two daughters."
One of these daughters was Louisa Jones,
wife of Thomas Jones. It directs the executors to take "the share or portion coming to Louisa, put it out at interest, and
pay the annual interest to Louisa during
her natural life." It directs that "after
her decease her share or portion shall be
"divided equally amongst her children,
share and share alike."
There were at the testator's death five
sons of Louisa. One of them afterwards
died, before her, viz.: in 1885. Another
died in 1897. Louisa died in 1898. The
son who died in 1885 was unmarried.
The son who died in 1897, an illegitimate,
left to survive him a widow and two children, of whom one died in 1898, after
Louisa, his grandmother. Did the sons
who died in 1885 and 1897 transmit any
estate to next of kin ? The answer to the
question will depend on the answer to the
other questions. (1) Had the children of
Louisa a vested, or a contingent remainder
in the legacy; and (2) was the illegitimate
one of these legatees.
(I) We think the children took a vested
legacy. An absolute estate in the eighth
would have been given to Louisa, but for
the direction to the executors to invest,
and what follows it. This direction reduces the interest to a life estate. But,
after her death, her share is "to be divided
equally amongst her children." Nothing
suggests that the gift to the children is
contingent on their surviving their
mother. It could not have been the intention to deprive grand-children, children of
a dead child, of any share. Cf. Provencheic's Ap. 67 Pa. 466; Thomman's Ap.
161 Pa. 444; McCleeve's Ap. 72 Pa. 414.
The share of the son who died in 1885,
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if the estate remained personalty to his
death, vested absolutely in his mother.
Sect. 3, Act April 8th, 1833; 1 P. & L.
2,410. If it is to be deemed realty by a
conversion before his death his share
vested in her for life, and the remainder in
his brothers. But, it was already a remainder after her life. It vested, therefore, in his brothers. Sect. 3, 4, Act 8th
April, 1833, 1 )P. &. L. 2,410. Unfortunately the evidence does not show whether
the conversion took place before or after
the son's death in 1885.
Was the illegitimate son entitled to
share? He was not, and for two reasons.
(a) He was a brother of the half-blood.
Before he could have inherited it would
have been necessary that there should be
no brothers of the whole-blood, and no
mother. The whole brother took his
estate. Had there been none such, his
mother would have taken it. Sect. 4, 5,
Act April 8th, 1833, 1 P. & L. 244, 2,412.
(b) He was an illegitimate. As such, he
was at common law, nullius filius. There
could be no collateral inheritance from
him. The Act of April 27th, 1855, 1 P. &
L. 2,420, enables an illegitimate and its
mother to inherit from each other, and the
Act of June 5th, 1883, 1 P. & L. 2,420, enables illegitimate children, of the same
mother, to inherit from each other. The
illegitimate son could not inherit from the
Cf. Woltemate's Ap. 86
legitimate son.
Pa. 219.
The testator's will directs that should
Louisa desire "that her portion be invested in real estate," the executors
"shall have full power and authority to do
so, if they find it to be for the bestinterest,"
of Louisa and the children. Louisa consenting, the executors have in fact invested
her share in realty. Cases cited by counsel
to the effect that a mere power or direction
to convert does not convert, are irrelevant.
The executors have exercised the power,
and in fact converted the money into
land. Those who were owners of the personalty thus converted became owners of
the land with similar interests. Louisa
takes a life estate in the land, as in the
money. The children take a vested remainder in the land, as in the money.
The illegitimate son, as we have seen, if
he acquired anything under the will, ha%
.acquired nothing by inheritance. He was

one of five sons, and at most, a devisee of
one-fifth of the estate. But was he a devisee? The will directs that Louisa's
share, at her death, "shall be divided
equally amongst her children, share and
share alike." We know nothing of the
testator's intention as to these devisees,
except what this language imputes. Does
"her children" include illegitimates?
We think not. Only legitimates are to be
understood by such a word, unless it
clearly appears that others are intended.
Root's Estate, 187 Pa. 118; Appel v.
Byers, 98 Pa. 479.
The devise was, therefore, to the four
legitimate children. On the death of one
of these, if the money had been already
converted into land, the other three became
entitled to it in remainder. If it had not
been already converted into land, Louisa
became owner absolutely, of one-quarter,
with a life estate in three-quarters. She
has since died. What has become of her
quarter? Under the Act of April 27th,
1855, 1 P. & L. 2,420, the illegitimate son
would have taken one-fourth of it, had he
survived his mother. Opdyke's Ap. 49
Pa. 373. But he. died before her. His
widow may be put out of the question,
since, even had he been legitimate, she
could have no dower. But, do his children inherit? They do not. Steckel's
Ap. 64 Pa. 492. The widow's one-fourth,
therefore, has gone to the three legitimate
sons.
It follows, therefore, that whether the
conversion of the money into land had
taken place before, orafter the death of the
son in 1885, the three legitimate sons own
the land in fee, and John Jones, the plaintiff, is entitled to recover an undivided
third of the land.
JOHN COLGAN vs. JACOB TOLGER,
ET AL.

Exemption-Motion to set amide Appi-aisement.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Colgan loaned $1,500 to Tolger and John,
his brother, taking, as security, a stock of
goods, of which Colgan took possession.
He subsequently obtained judgment and
issued execution. The sheriff levied on
the goods. The defendants claiming $300
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exemption, the sheriff set apart $600 worth
of goods, jointly selected by them. On
rule, the court is asked to set aside the
appraisement, on the ground that the defendants are not entitled to any exempted
property.
CLIPPINGER and MEYER for plaintiff.
1. Joint owners of stock pledged for
joint debt cannot claim exemption out of
the proceeds of a sheriff's sale. Hawley
v. Hampton, 160 Pa. 18; Bonsall v. Conly,
44 Pa. 442.
2. Members of partnership are not severally entitled to $300 out of firm property.
Cligg v. Houston, 1 Phila. 352; Billingsley
v. Spencer, 64 Mo. 355.
3. Pledge of personalty implies a waiver of the benefits of exemption law. Hawley v. Hampton, 760 Pa. 18; McAuley's
Appeal, 35 Pa. 209.
AUBREY and DEAL for defendant.
1. Under exemption law of 1849 property to the value of $.00, exclusive of defendant's wearing apparel, etc., may be
set aside for the benefit of defendhnt.
Act of Apr. 9, 1849, P. L. 533; P. & L. Digest, 1919.
2. Exemption law must be construed
so as to admit a debtor to enjoy S-300 of his
stock in trade. Hawley v. 6'Donald, 30
Pa. 261.
3. A firm may claim the benefit of exemption law as to partnership property.
Stewart v. Baron, 37 N. Y. 350.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The court of common pleas has the
power to set aside an appraisement, made
at the instance of a debtor claiming that
the property is exempt from execution, if
the property is in fact not exempt. Hawley v. Hampton, 160 Pa. 18. But should
this appraisement be set aside?
The first section of the act of April 9,
1849, 1 P. & L. 1920 exempts from execution "property to the value of $300, exclusive of all wearing apparel of the defendant and his family*
* * * owned
by or in possession of any debtor," and
the second section of this act requires the
sheriff or constable to cause an appraisement to be made. Two exceptions are
taken to the appraisement of Tolger's
property; (1) The fact that it had already
been pledged for the debt; and (2) the fact
that the debt and judgment was against
both Jacob and John Tolger, and the property appraised was the property of both.
1. The principle is well settled that if
the debtor has pledged property to secure
a debt, he cannot have any portion of it ex-

empted from the creditor's execution. As
against land, mortgaged for a debt, Gangwere's Appeal, 36 Pa. 466, the exemption is
not allowed, There would be no good
reason for distinguishing, in this respect,
between land and personalty. The "stock
of goods" has been assigned as collateral
security. By that contract the creditor
may devote it to the payment of his debt.
He might have sold it without execution.
He does not lose his right to insist on the
sale of it by execution. Hawley v. Hampton, 160 Pa. 18.
It is probably settled in Pennsylvania
that, as against the creditor of a partnership, the partners have no right to the exemption of any of the firm's assets from.
sale in execut'on. Bonsall v. Conly, 44
Pa. 442; Assigned Estate of Lippincott, 8
Phila. 236; Clegg v. Houston, 1 Phila.
352. But, if the execution for the joint
debt is levied on individual property of
one of the partners, Clegg v. Houston, 1
Phila. 352; or of both of them, Assigned
Estate of Lippincott, 8 Phila. 9.36, he, in
the former case, and they, in the latter,
may claim the exemption. So, if two
persons, not partners, are sued as joint
tort-feasors, and ajudgment against both
is obtained, each may have the benefit of
the exemption, when his goods are levied
on in execution. Spade v. Bruner, 72
Pa. 57. It is not then, the jointness of the
debt and judgment, but the jointness of
the goods levied on, that precludes the
exemption.
It does not appear that the Tolgers were
in partnership, nor, if they were, that the
property levied on was of that partnership. For aught that appears, it may
have been Jacob's alone, or they may
haveheld as tenants in common, orJohn's
alone. If it was Jacob's alone, orJohn's
alone, they would severally be entitled to
the exempted property, but only to $300
worth. The appraisers have set apart
$600 worth.
This would be cause for
setting their appraisement aside.
It does reasonably appear that the property was owned by Jacob and John Tolger, as tenants in common. The goods
set apart to them were "jointly selected
by them." Are tenants in common precluded from claiming exemption of the
property held by thein as such? We are
not able to realize why they should be.
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If one debtor owned an undivided half of to convey were worth only $800, $400
a horse, or a bale of cotton, it would apiece, and that was the price paid by
hardly be said that he could not claim the Paul's agent. The lots actually conveyed
exemption of this undivided half. If
were worth $800 apiece. This is an action
another 'ebtor, on a different debt, owned to recover the differance of price, i. e., $800.
the other half, with equal right, he could
EDWARDS and VALENTINE for plaintiff.
claim a similar exemption. If the fact
1. Whenever one man is enriched at
that they are jointly indebted deprives expense of another, the latter has an action
recover compensation for loss he susthem of this exemption, it would seem to to
tained by reason of enrichment.
be because of the jointness of the debt,
2. Since parties may not be placed in
statuo quo it is but reasonable that Brown
and not of the tenancy of the goods in
common. We have not discovered good should recover the $800 in assumpsit.
Nickel Co. v. Nuivin L. R., 2
cause for holding that the tenancy in Sheffield
Q. B. 214; 5 R. R. & P. page 3941, section
common precludes the exemption. When 23-63; 41 Amer. Die. 100.
3. Money paid under mistake of fact
there are two debtors, $600 worth of goods,
$300 worth of goods of each can be exempt- can be recovered and negligence in paying
no bar. Meredith v. Haynes, 14 W. N9
ed from execution sale. Spade v. Bruner, is
C. 364; McKibben v. Doyle, 173 Pa. 579;
72 Pa. 57; Assigned Estate of Lippincott, Baink v. Etterldge, 40 N. Y. 321.
8 .Phila. 236. When the creditor gives
BOWERS and YEAGER for defendant.
credit to one debtor he does so knowing
1. Where mistake has any effect at all
that he can levy on the debtor's estate, it renders a contract void. Clark on Conminus the $300 worth. If he chooses to tracts, 307.
2. A party is barred by his own negligive the credit to two debtors, he gains gence from recovery. Hollenback
v. Dethe power to levy on the estates of both, witt, 2 John R. 404; Greenfield's Est., 14
but from each $300 will be subtracted. Pa. 496; Johnson v. Paterson, 114 Pa. 398.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
And it must be entirely immaterial to
The plaintiff does not proceed in a Court
him whether the two estates converge on
the same chattels or not. The securities in Equity seeking to rescind the sale or
levied on in Hawley v. Hampton, 160 Pa. reform the deed made by him to Paul.
The erection of a house in the lots of the
18, were probably partnership property.
latter precluded this.
For the first reason the appraisement
The mistake in conveying the lots was
must be set aside.
SILAS BROWN vs. TIMOTHY PAUL.
Mistake in Contract-Suit for DamageAction in Assumpsit.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Brown orally contracted to sell a certain
piece of land, containing two lots, with
Paul's agent, and caused a deed to be
made,which mistakenly described another
piece of land on the same street. The deed
was executed without perusal by Brown,
and sent by him by mail to Paul, with
the information that it was made in pursuance of an understanding with Paul's
agent. Paul did not examine the deed.
A year afterwards, he came to the town
with his deed, and going to the lots
described in it, contracted for the erection
of a house on one of them. The house was
erected. After its completion Brown discovered his mistake. The lots he intended

wholly due to the want of care and negligence of the grantor. He caused the deed
to be prepared. It was not read by him.
There was no fraud, misrepresentation,
concealment, violation of confidence or
other inequitable conduct on the part of
Paul, the grantee.
And it may well be doubted whether
under such circumstances a court in equity
would grant any relief.
"Where a vendor sold a leasehold interest the purchaser as well as himself believing it had a shorter time to run than it
actually had, relief was refused after conveyance." Kerr on Fraud and Mistake,
p. 430.
Where, "A having an interest in a residuary estate assigned all his interest to B,
and it afterward appeared that the estate
included a fund, the existence of which
was unknown to either of them at the
time of the execution of the deed," the
Court refused to interfere. Hawkins v.
Jackson, 2 Me. & G. 272. See also, Green-

T'H
field's Estate, 14 Pa. 496; Johnson v. Patterson, 114 Pa. 398.
Here the plaintiff, however, seeks to
recover the difference between the value
of the lots*actually conveyed, and those
which the grantor intended to convey.
There was no such contract, express or
implied, on the part of the defendant. The
latter did not undertake to do so. He did
not obtain the conveyance by means of
any fraudulent representations, or artifice
or trick. He agreed to purchase two lots at
$400 each, and hepaid that sum. Thelaw
will not impose upon him al additional
obligation which it may be inconvenient,
or possibly impossible for him to discharge,
because the grantor was grossly negligent.
We are of opinion that plaintiff' is not
entitled to recover and enter judgment in
favor of defendant.
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Bell v. Clark, 171 Pa. 92; McGrew v.
Foster, 113 Pa. 642; Dyer v. Wright, 162
Pa. 405.
G. ARTHUR BOLTE and KENNEDy for
defendaht.
1. The mode of enforcing specific performance is by ejectient; question there
being whether under circumstances a
chancellor would decree specific performance. Remington v. Irwin, 14 Pa. 143;
Reno v. Moss, 120 Pa. 49 ; Piersol v. Neill,
63 Pa. 42; .cases there cited.
2. Usually time is not of essence of contract. DeCamp v. Fealy, 5 S. & R. 323;
Remington v. Irwin, 14 Pa. 143. Butitis
so if parties so contract, and equity will enforce the in'entions of parties. Westman
v. Means, 12 Pa. 97 ; Sylvester v. Born, 102
Pa. 467.
3. Negligence is a bar to a suit in equity.
Benedict v. Johnson, 1 Johnson Ch. 369;
Russell v. Baughman, 94 Pa. 400; Alexander's Ap. 118 Pa. 121 ; Jones v. Jones, 11
Phila. 56.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

JOHN WOOD vs. SAMUEL TREGO.
Conditional Sale-Ejectment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

On July 7th, 1897, Wood and Trego executed an agreement, wherein "said Trego
agrees to buy from its present owner Lot
No. 47, on Ames street, in the borough of
New Cumberland, for not more than $450,
and to allow said Wood to take possession
of it, to erect a house on it, and to become
owner of it, on paying monthly $20, until
the sum of $450 is repaid to Trego. If
Wood shall fail to pay any such installment for twomonths, this agreement shall
become void, and Trego may resume possession, and Wood shall forfeit whatever
he may have paid, and lose all claim to
the land." Wood paid promptly until
$400 had been paid with interest. Meantime he had erected on the lot a house costing $2,500. Theremainder of the $450 rot
having been paid for six months, Trego
took possession, and excluded Wood from
the premises. Wood brings this ejectment
after tendering the unpaid money and
interest.
LIGHT and ALEXANDER for plaintiff.
1. To entitle a person to recover he
must tender money in court when verdict
Plaintiff here expresses
is rendered.
willingness to pay money and interest
due. Minsker v. Morrison, 2 Yeates 344;

The agreement between Wood and Trego
stipulates 'for the payment of $450 in
monthly sums of $20. It also provides
that "if Wood shall fail to pay any such
instalment for two months, this agreement
shall become void, and Trego may resume
possession, and Wood shall forfeit whatever he may have paid, and lose all claim
to the land." Wood has failed to pay
three of the instalments for more than two
mouths. Trego insisting that Wood's
claim to the land was extinct, re-entered,
excluding him.
The contract is hardly susceptible of two
interpretations. Contractual time is not
"of the essence," perhaps, unless itclearly
appears to be so, because of the frequent
failures to observe it, and the as frequent
condonations of such failures by the
parties. Persons suijuris must, however,
be allowed to make time "of the essence 11
iftheywill. Though very wise, the courts
are not the guardians of business men,
who are often as sane and shrewd as the
judges. We take it then, that the only
question is, whether the parties really
meant that a default for two months,
should have the consequences which they
took pains to describe. "This agreement,"
they say, "shall become void." That is
reasonably explicit But they add, "and
Trego may resume possession." But rijht
to resume possession is not the sole reshlt.
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"And Wood shall forfeit whatever he may
have paid." Nay, more: "And lose all
claim to the land." In Axford v. Thomas,
160 Pa. 8, the language was hardly as emphatic, but it was accepted as expressive
of the intent that the vendee should lose
the land, on his failure to pay the instalments within the time. Benedict v.
Lynch, iJohns Ch. 370, cited by the
learned counsel for the defendant is equally
forceful.
The parties contemplated that Wood
might make improvements for they provide that he should be allowed to take
possession of the lot and "to erect a house
on it." But, although the increase of the
value of the lot by such an erection was
thus contemplated, Wood agreed that if
he made default, he should "lose all claim
to the land." There was no fraud; no imposition; no mistake. Wood was willing
to agree for the prompt payment of the instalments, in order to secure the right to
take possession, and complete his ownership by gradual payments of the price.
We discover no reason to allow him to
claim a benefit under the contract, and repudiate so much of it as requires a prompt
payment of the purchase money as it falls
due.
The contract was already void, and
Wood had already lost all cldim to the
land when Trego re-entered. We know
no means by which his dead rights can be
resuscitated. His belated tender of the
purchase money cannot revive them.
Judgment affirmed.
R. R. CO. vs. INS. CO.
Indemnity insurance contract.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Defendant was incorporated to insure
title to land, immunity from liability, etc.
Plaintiff insured in it for one year, against
"liability for damages arising to passengers or strangers * * from any and all
accidents to or by cars, poles and wires."
A fire in the power house interrupted the
running of the cars for a season during
which horses were employed to pull them.
One of these horses from the negligence of
the driver, threw down a boy eight years
old, and seriously hurt him so that the

Company was compelled to pay $3000 by
judgment. It sues the Ins. Co. for this
amount. Defendant ask court to say, (1)
The Ins. is against public policy and void.
(2) The accident which caused the loss is
out of the class against whose results the
insurance is a protection. (3) The recovery
by the boy of the judgment is neither
prima facie nor conclusive evidence
against the defendant, that the accident
was negligent or that the damages recovered were properly recovered.
Assumpsit.
L. FLOYD HESS for the plaintiff.
1. These contracts are not contrary to
public policy, and have been sustained
heretofore.-Amer. Casualty Ins. Co. Case,
82 Ml. 525; Horse Car Co. v. Fidelity Ins.
Co., 160 Pa. 354; Employers Liability v.
Morrill, 155 Mass. 404.
2. This is within the class of things insured against since it is not held that electric cars must be used, but simply cars,
and cars are useless without motive power.
Anyway this is a transient use of things
in case of emergency.-Krings v. German
Fire Ins. Co., 147 Pa. 272; Bentley v. Ins.
Co., 191 Pa. 280-2; Horse Car Co. v. Fidelity
165 Pa. 354.
3. A decision of a court of concurrent
jurisdiction cannot be attacked in a collateral suit by privy to first suit.-Walker
v. Tollansbee, 74 Pa. 306; 12 Amer. and
Eng. Enc. of Law, 86.
4. Ins. Co. must reimburse for legally
recovered damages if uncontrolled by special words in contract. Employers Liability v. Morrill, 155 Mass. 404-9; Porter on
Ins., 2nd Amer. Ed. p. 464.
H. M. HARPEL attorney for the defendant.
1. A R. R. Co. carrying passengers may
not contract against its own negligence.Pa. R. R. Co. v. Butler, 57 Pa. 33.5; Pa. R.
R. Co. v. Henderson, 51 Pa. 315; Goldey
v. Pa. R. R. Co., 30 Pa. 242.
2. Accident causing loss is without the
class of things insured against and court
has no latitude in construing policy but
must hold both parties to the contract as
made.-Fuchs v. Germantown Farmers'
Mut. Ins. Co., 60 Wisc. 290; Nathan W.
Leach v. Patrick Anderson, 58 N.Y. 632.
3. Judgment is not admissible in evidence against defendants and the latter
may set up any defense he could atfirst.Strong and Grant v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 62
Mo. 289: Del. Mo. Co. v. Quaker City, 3
Grant. 71.
4. A judgment is only binding upon
party in suit.-Hale v. Finch, 104 U. S.
161._
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OPIMON OF THE COURT.
I. The contract is assailed by defendant
on the ground that it is against public
policy in that it virtually lessens the penalty which follows negligence on the part
of the insured toward those to whom it
owes a legal duty. This view has not received judicial sanction. Am. and Eng.
Ency. of Law, 2d Ed. Vol. II p. 10; American Casualty Ins. Co.'s Case, 82 Md. 535.
And see Phillipsburg Horse Car Co. v.
Fidelity and Casualty Co., 160 Pa. 364, and
Employers' Liability v. Morrill, 155 Mass.
404..
II.
It is contended that the accident
which caused the loss is not of the class
against whose results the insurance is a
protection. The contract by its terms insures against liability for damage arising
"from any and all accidents to or by cars,
poles and wires."
The liability in this
case arose from an accident caused by
horses employed in pulling the cars, a fire
in the power house having necessitated
the temporary substitution of horse power
for electricity, which appears to have been
the motive power usually employed. It is
not shown that the company had no
authority under its charter to use any motive power that it might select; nor is the
insurance limited to electric or any particular kind of cars. We may fairly assume then thatthe insurance was designed
to cover accidents caused by any cars that
might be used, whether operated by electric, cable, steam or horse power. And if
the insurance extends to liability arising
from accidents caused by horse-cars, we
believe that it includes liability for injuries
caused by the horses attached to the cars
and providing the motive power for the
cars. The insurance policy must be liberally construed in favor of the insured, so
as not to defeat, without a plain necessity,
his claim to the indemnity which, in
making the insurance, it was his object to
procure. When words are without violence
susceptible of two interpretations, that
which will sustain the claim and cover the
loss should be adopted. Ins. Co. v. Cropper, 32 Pa. 351; Burkhard v. Ins. Co., 102
Pa. 262; Humphreys v. Ins. Co.. 139 Pa. 264;
Bale v. Ins. Co., 159 Pa. 53. We think
that the above rule requires us to construe
the term "cars"
as including the horses

attached to them. Any other construction would certainly be unreasonable, for
there would be no purpose in insuring
against accidents caused by horse-cars and
not against accidents caused by the horses
employed in pulling them.
The case of Phillipsburgh Horse-Car Co.
v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. (supra),although somewhat similar to the case at
bar, is readily distinguishable. There the
plaintiff appeared by its name to be a
horse-car company, and by its charter it
had no power to use any other vehicle or
any other motive power. Undersuch circumstances, it is perfectly obvious that the
parties did not intend the insurance against
liability resulting from accidents caused
by "horses, cars, plant, ways, works, machinery or appliances" to extend to accidents caused by sleighs. And as the judge
by way of dictum there said, such insurance would not extend to accidents caused
by cars propelled by steam or electricity.
But in the case before us the insurance was
against liability resulting from accidents
caused by "cars, wires and poles," and although electriQ cars appear to have been
in use at the time, it is not shown that the
company had no authority to substitute
horses, or that the policy was not intended
to include horse-cars as well as electric
cars. Indeed, it is quite conceivable that
the broad term, "cars," was used with the
purpose of covering any temporary or even
permanent change in the motive power.
III. The defendant contends further
that the judgment against the plaintiff for
$3,000 is neither prima facie nor conclusive
evidence of the liability of the defendant
in this action; in other words, that since
it does not appear that defendant was notified of the accident, or of the action against
plaintiff, the burden rests upon the plaintiff to show that the accident actually occurred, that it was due to the negligence
of the railroad company's employ6, and
that the damages recovered against it were
properly recovered.
Insurance policies of this kind customarily contain a provision that the insurance
company shall be relieved from liability
unless notice of the accident is given to it
within a certain number of days. It does
not appear that such a condition, or any
condition, in regard to notice was exacted
by the company in the case at bar, and in
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view of that fact, we think the insurance
company must accept the judgment
against the plaintiff as prima facie evidence, at least, that the accident was due
to negligence on the part of plaintiff's employ6, and that the damages recovered
were properly recovered. A contract of
insurance is -an indemnity contract, and
the rule is that judgment against the person indemnified is conclusive against the
indemnitor if notice is given, and prima
facie evidence of his liability if no notice is
given. Am. & Eng. Fucyc. of Law, Vol.
12, p. 100; Huzzard v. Nagle, 40 Pa. 178.
Judgment for plaintiff

WM. ADAMS vs. JOHN SMYTHE.
Parolcontract-Consideration.
STATEM NT OF THE CASE.

Adams' land was about to be sold on
execution. He induced Smytheto buy it,
at the sale and to promise to let him repurchase it within a year for what Smythe
paid for it. Smythe executed and delivered to Adams a writing: "Whereas I am
-about to buy the farm of Wn. Adams at a
sheriff's sale, I agree to convey it to him
at any time within the year, for the price
I shall payforit. John Smythe." Smythe
bid $3400, which he paid and received the
deed, Aug. 27, 1894. Had Smythe not
agreed to buy, Adams would have been
able to induce his brother, Jacob Adams,
to buy it on similar terms, but this fact
was not made known to Smythe. On
December 22, 1894, Win. Adams tendered
the $3400 with interest to Smythe, who
refused to accept it or to make a deed.
Ejeetment.
MILLER and G.RY for the plaintiff.
1. The agreement to recovery is binding; for the plaintiff gave up a right --:to
have some one else bid, and the promise
to forbear need not be expressed if it can
be implied. Harner v. Seidway, 124 N.
Y. 538; Lindell v. Rokes, 60 Mo. 251.
SmiTn and TAYLOR, W., for thedefendant.
1. There was no consideration for the
agreement to reconvey, and it cannot be
enforced. Mers v. Franklin Ins. Co., 60
Mo. 127; Kramer v. Dinsmore, et al., 152
Pa. 264; Mead v. Conroe, 113 Pa. 220.

OPINION OF TRE COURT.

If Adams is entitled to recover, it is because Smythe holds the land subject to a
trust for him, or because of a contract to
convey it to Adams. It is quite clear that
in this state, no trust arises from the fact
that, when A's land is being sold by the
sheriff, B appears at the sale and buys it,
at the instance of A; or, under a promise
to A to allow him to repurchase it. In
many such cases, the promise has been in
parol, and the effort has been to evade the
statute of frauds by inventing a resulting
trust or a trust ex maleficlo. The effort
has not succeeded. Kraft v. Smith, 117
Pa. 183; Kistler's Appeal, 73 Pa. 73.
Smythe's agreement, however, is in
writing. There is no need to feign a trust
in order to escape the statute of frauds.
If there is a good contract between Adams
and Smythe, Adams can as well recover
the possession by ejectment, on the footing of the contract, as on that of a
trust. The writing defines theland as the
farm of Adams which 8mythe is about to
buy. It agrees to convey the farm at any
time witbip the year, and for the price
that Smythe should pay. The parties,
the subject, the price, the terms, the time
of conveyance, are all adequately defined.
The writing, however, is not under seal,
and it is urged that there is no consideration for Smythe's promise. Is there?
Smythe, like any citizen, had the right
to attend and bid at the sale. So had
Jacob, brother of Win. Adams. Smythe
might have desired to be free from the
competition of J. Adams, and William's
undertaking to free him from it, would
have been consideration for Smythe's
promise. But the difficulty in supposing
such a consideration lies ii the absence
of any conceivable benefit to Smythe.
What was he to gain by buying the
land? He was obligating himself, Adams
contends, to convey it at any time, within
a year, for the exact price paid for it, plus
interest. But, if the chance that Adams
would lettheright to redeem slip, by failing
to tender payment within the year, was of
value to Smythe, there is still no evidence
that Jacob Adams' abstention from bidding was so much as suggested to Smythe.
That J. Adams could be induced to buy,
should Smythe not agree to re-sell to Win.
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Adams, was not made known to Smythe.
It was, then, not the consideration for his
promise.. The plaintiff begged Smythe to
buy the land and let him repurchase it.
Smythe, intending to do so, in fact, bought
it, with his own money, at a price ascertained to be fair by the ordinary competition; and, having bought it, embodied his
benevolent intention as to the phlintiff, in
the writing now sued on. It is impossible
to discover any consideration' for the
promise. In this respect Smythe's promise
is different from that of the defendant In
Kramer v. Dinsmore, 152 Pi. 264.
The court, therefore, as we still think
did right, in instructing the jury that
their verdict should be for the defendant,
and the motion for anew trial is overruled.
ADAM KLEIN vs. HOMER HARPER.
Mechanics' lien-Stipulalion dqain.st
Liens - What bi sufficient recording or
f!'ing-Prothonotary'snegligence.
STATEM!ENT OF THE CASE.
Harper, owner of land, contracted with
Simpson for the erection of a house on it
for $6,000, Simpson covenanting "that no
liens for labor or material shall be entered
against the premises, or, if entered, that
they shall be discharged." This contract
was signed by Harper and Simpson, at
once, and was filed in the prothonotary's
office nine days after its execution. The
prothonotary, however, neglected to record
the contract in the mechanics' lien docket,
as the Act of 26th of June, 1895, P. L.
369, requires.
Simpson bought the bricks from Klein,
to the worth of $1,400. Klein has filed a
mechanics' lien against the house.
Motion to strike off the lien.
RUSSEL and SHIPMAN for the plaintiff.
All the requirements of the statute are
complied with. June 26, 1895, P. L. 369;
P. & r,. Dig. Vol. 3, p. $95.
A mortgage and a deed are recorded in
contemplation of law the moinent they
are left for record in the recorder's office.
Brooke's Ap. 64 Pa. 127 ;Clader v. Thomas,
89 Pa. 343 ; Pottsville Borough v. Curry, 32
Pa. 444:
DIEARKLE and RILEY for the defendant.
Contract was not properly recorded and
cannot divest the lien of Klein. Act of

June 26, 1895, P. & L. Dig. 369; Armstrong
v. Hallowell. 85 Pa. 495; Irish v. Harvey,
44 Pa. 76 ; Kime v. Crider, 6 Dist. Pa. 688.
An agreement between owner and contractor to enter no liens is no notice to subcontractois unless recorded as Act of June
26, 1895, requires. Kime v. Crider. Supra.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Two questions present themselves in this
case. (1) Was thestipulation in the contract concerning liens sufficient, but for
the Act of June 26th, 1895, to prevent the
filing of a lien, and (2) if so, has there been
such non-compliance with that Act as to
deprive the stipulation of its virtue.
The policy of the state is to protect materialmen by giving them a lien on the
premises into which the materials furnished by them enter. The right, however, of the owner to stipulate with the
contractor against such lien, and thereby
to prevent it, is fully recognized. Indeed
it is so secure that the legislature cannot
take it away. It cannot, for example,
make the written consent of the materialman to the stipulation against liens indispensable to the effectiveness of the stipulation. Waters v. Wolf, 162 Pa. 153;
McMaster v. West Chester State Normal
School, 162 Pa. 260.
The stipulation, however, against liens
must be clear. An agreement that liens
shall be removed is not equivalent to an
agreement that none shall ever attach.
Had the contract between Harper and
Simpson been "that no liens for labor or
material shall be entered against the
premises," the entry of the lien would be
a breach of it. The entry, therefore, would
have been precluded. Fidelity Mut. Life
Co. v. Jackson, 163 Pa. 203. But the contract is in the alternative. Simpson did
not agree that no liens should be entered,
but that none should be entered, "1or, if
entered, that they shall be discharged."
The entry of a lien was not a breach of
this covenant. It simply imposed on
Simpson the duty of performing the other
alternative, viz., discharging it. Hence,
nothing precludes the filing of a lien.
Cresswell Iron Works v. O'Brien, 156 Pa.
172; Lucas v. O'Brien, 159 Pa. 535; Gordon
v. Norton, 186 Pa. 168.
Since the contract does not preclude the
filing of liens, it becomes unnecessary to
inquire whether, had it done so, it would
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have lost its virtue because of the prothdnotary's disobedience of the Act of 26th
June, 1895, P. L. 369. That Act makes
the efficacy of a stipulation against liens
contingent (1) on its "specifically" covenanting against such lien by sub-contractor or other person, (2) on its being in
writing, signed by the parties, and (3) on
its being filed with the prothonotary of
the county. The second and third of these
conditions have been complied with. An
independent section of the Act is addressed, not to the parties, but to the prothonotary. It requires him to record such
contract or qtipulation in the mechanics'
lien docket, and to index the record in a
certain manner. The Act makes simply
the filing necessary to the preservative of
the owner's immunity from lien.
The object of the recording of the contract, like that of the recording of deeds,
is to make it possible for all parties concerned to become aware of the existence
and contents of the contract. When a
deed is left for record, the grantee acquires
the immunity contemplated by the law,
before it is actually recorded, and though
it is never recorded; or though it is recorded in the wrong book. Farabee v.
McKerrihap, 172 Pa. 234; Glading v.
Frick, 88 Pa. 460; and cases cited by the
learned counsel for the defendant. As the
grantee is not responsible for the neglect
of the recorder, and should not suffer for
it, so the owner is not responsible, nor
should he suffer for the negligence of the
prothonotary.
The motion to strike off will be denied,
not for the reasons assigned by the counsel
for the plaintiff, but because the stipulacovenant
tion does not "specifically
against such lien by sub-contractor or
other person."
JOHN BAKER vs. SOBIESKI SIMPSON.
Agency-Resulting trust-Statute of limitation-Notice.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Simpson employed Samuel Stone, as
agent, to purchase for him a tract of land,
at not more than $5,000, putting that sum
in Stone's hands. Stone procured a conveyance, but, for some reason, had himself

named in the deed as grantee, though the
grantor was told by him that the purchase
was for Simpson. Simpson took possession of the land and eight years tlereafter,
a judgment being obtained against Stone,
this tract was levied on in execution as his,
and sold to Baker. Baker, before buying,
examined the records of deeds, and found
that Stone was the grantee. He had no
knowledge of the fact of agency, nor of the
possession of Simpson. Ejectment.
STAUFFER and WINLACK for the plaintiff.
Simpson could have held against Stone,
but he cannot against Stone's bona fide
purchaser for value. Tillman v. Divers,
31 Pa. 42; Church v. Church, 25 Pa. 278;
Wilson v. Shoenberger's Ex., 34 Pa. 121.
Possession is not of itself notice, either
actual or constructive. Townsend v. Little, 109 U. S. 505; Wright v. Wood, 23 Pa.
120.
SHREVE and Mis9 MARVEL for the defendant.
A resulting trust exists in favor of the
person furnishing the money. Lloyd v.
Woods, 176 Pa. 63; Light v. Zellar, 144 Pa.
570.
The sixth section of the Act of April 22,
1856, does not run against cestai que trust
in possession. Miller v. Baker, 160 Pa.
179.
Possession by one claiming an equitable
title is notice to a purchaser or creditor of
such title. Hottenstein v. Lerch, 104 Pa.
454; White v. Patterson, 139 Pa. 429.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

It is not disputed that the purchase by
Stone of the land made him a trustee for
Simpson, his principal, with whose
nioneys he paid for it. Light v. Zellar,
144 Pa. 570; Lloyd v. Woods, 176 Pa. 63.
Simpson took possession of the land, Stone
not challenging his right, but admitting
it. The sixth section of the Act of April
22, 1856, 1 P. & L. 2683, which requires actions to enforce resulting trusts to be
brought within five years after" such trust
accrued," has no application, when the
cestui que trust is in possession. Miller v.
Baker, 160 Pa. 172. The lapse of time has
not prevented Simpson from asserting the
trust as against Stone.
On a judgment against Stone, the land
has been sold in execution to Baker. Baker
before buying, examined the record and
saw a deed from the former owner to Stone,
but nothing revealing that Stone held the
land for Simpson. Nothing is better set-

THE FORUM.
tled than that an undisclosed trust is ineffectual as against one who purchases, for
a consideration, the land from the trustee.
Dolan v. Kelley, 10 Cent. 289; Miller v.
Baker, 160 Pa. 172.
Stone had made no conveyance to Simpson ; nor any declaration of trust that
might have been recorded. Constructive
notice of the trust was not given to Baker
by any record. But, Simpson was in possession of the land at the time of Baker's
purchase. Was this possession notice?
One in possession is usually in possession
under some claim of right, and one who
undertakes to buy the premises from a
third person is bound to know, in ordinary
cases at least, of the possession, and to inquire of the person in possession concerning his right. If he inquires, he learns
what the right is, and is therefore affected
by it, or the person inquired of misinforms,
or refuses to inform him. In that case, he
is estopped from setting up his right, whatever it may be, against the baffled or deceived purchaser. If inquiry is neglected,
it will be presumed by the courts that it
would have been successful. Baker found
an apparent ownership in Stone, but he
saw that Simpson was in possession. Had
he inquired of the latter, he would have
learned that he claimed the land under a
trust resulting to him from the purchase,
with his money and for him, of the land
by Stone. He did not inquire, as he should
have done. The trust, therefore, affects
him as much as it affected Stone. Hottenstein v. Lerch, 104 Pa. 454; Lance v.
Gorman, 136 Pa. 200; Anderson v. Brinser,
129 Pa. 376.
This ejectment is by Baker, the holder
of the legal title, against Simpson, the
cestui que trust. Simpson has a right to a
conveyance, or a declaration of trust, and,
as against the trustee, to the possession of
the premises. For this reason, Baker cannot recover in this ejeetment.
Judgment affirmed.
WILLIAM SOMMER vs. LEWIS
STEWART.
Set-off-Decedents' estates:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Rebbeca Stewart bequeathed all her
estate to her two sons, Lewis and John.

It amounted to $2700, in addition toa debt
owing to her by William Sommer, of $1000.
Sommer, holding a note for $400 of Lewis
Stewart, brings this assumpsit. Stewart,
with the consent of his brother, pleads the
set-off of Sommer's debt to the estate.
SLOAN and W. H. TAYLOR for the plaintiff.
Legatee under a will cannot set-off in
assumpsit a debt due by plaintiff to the
estate.
Brightly's Digest, 4 vol. 1903;
Gerber v. Meredith, 160 Pa. 102; Trunich
v. Gilchrist, 81 Pa. 160.
SAULSBURY and SHAFFER for the defendant.
Defendant claims the right to set off his
debt for the reason that mutual demands
mutually pay and satisfy each other, and
prevent multiplicity of actions. Murry v.
Williams, 3 Binney 138; Sewing Machine
Co. v. Saylor, 86 Pa. 291; Pluckett v. Sauer,
101 Pa. 356.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
A set-off is in effect a cross-action by the
defendant against the plaintiff and consequently the matter sought to be set off
must be due from the party plaintiff to
the party defendant in the action. This
is elementary. (Am. and Eng. Ency. of
Law, vol. 22, p. 280 and cases cited.)
The defendant in the case before us,
pleads as a set-off a debt not due from the
plaintiff to him personally, but a debt due
to the estate of his mother, of which he
and his brother are the legatees. It is
true that his brother consents, that it does,
not appear that any other person is interested in the estate, and that, consequently,
no harm would result if we were to permit
the plea to stand. But we think there is
no sufficient reason for establishing an
exception to the general rule. On the
contrary, the recognition of such an exception as is contended for would in most
if not in nearly all cases result in great
injustice. For instance, if in the case at
bar there were debts of the estate outstanding, to permit the legatees .to plead
debts due to the estate as set-offs to claims
against them personally, would be to pay
the legatees at the expense of creditors of
the estate, or at least to give the legatees
priority over such creditors.
The case issimilar to Gerberv. Meredith,
160 Pa. 102, where it is held that one of
three legatees under a will to whom the
entire estate has been bequeathed, share
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and share alike, cannot set off a third of a
claim due to the estate against a debt due
to the plaintiff from him personally. The
only distinction between the two cases is
that whereas in Gerber v. Meredith thedefendant claimed to set off his share of the
debt due the estate, in the case at bar the
defendant, with the consent of the only
other legatee, desires to set off the entire
debt. But the difference is not material,
as in each case the debt desired to be set
off is not one from plaintiff to defendant,
but one from plaintiff to the estate.
Judgment for plaintiff.

OPINION OF THE COURT.

If the obligation of plaintiff and defendant, under the provision of the will which
requires that they "shall together contribute five hundred dollars yearly for the
support of my widow, so long as she shall
live," is a joint obligation, the plaintiff,
having paid the entire sum, is entitled to
contribution; but if the obligation is
merely several, the plaintiff was not bound
to pay more than his share, and for his
voluntary payment of the whole sum he
cannot enforce contribution. After a careful consideration of the language of the
will and the attendant circumstances, we
have concluded that the testator intended
WILLIAM HOWARD vs. SAMUEL
to impose ajoint obligation. The primary
BRUNELL.
purpose of the provision in question was
Decedents' estates-Contribution-Joint not to reduce the value of the devise to
and several obligations-Jurisdition.
each son, but to provide for the "support"
of the widow. The fulfillment of his wish
would be much more firmly secured by a
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
joint than by a several obligation, for while
George Brunell left a will in which he
in case of a several obligation the financial
devised one farm to his son Samuel, and
embarassment of one devisee would result
another to his grandson (of a deceased
in depriving the widow of a very material
daughter) William Howard.
These devises were followed by the part of her means of support, in the case
of a joint obligation her support would be
words, "and my will is that my son and
assured as long as either of the devisees
grandson shall together contribute $500
yearly for the support of my widow, so should continue to be able to furnish the
sum named in the will.
long as she may live."
Our conclusion is upheld in some
Brunell, being embarassed in business,
measure by the case of Shillito v. Shillito,
though he accepted the farm devised to
160 Pa. 167. There it appeared that James
him, paid nothing to his mother for eight
years, and Howard paid her on the aver- Shillito, father of plaintiff and defendant,
died leaving a will by which lie devised
age of $575 yearly.
his land to his two sons, and also directed
At the end of eight years he sued
as follows: " It is my will that my wife,
Brunell in assumpsit for eight times $250.
Violet, shall have a comfortable maintenPIPER and WALLACE for the plaintiff.
ance from my estate during her life, with
When Brunell accepted the farm devised
him a trust was created in favor of the
a house to live in. * * It is my will that
mother. Coltor v. Coltor, 127 U. S. 380.
my daughters, so long as they live unHe who accepts a benefit under a will
married with my wife, Violet, shall be
must conform to all its provisions. Hamilton v. Portor, 63 Pa. 332; Eten v. Green- provided for by my sons, W. Washington
and G. Milton." In a bill in equity for
walt, 98 Pa. 422.
If one of several sureties is obliged to
contribution the court declared that the
pay the whole debt lie cab enforce contritwo sons, by accepting the land, became
ution from the others so a to equalize his
jointly and severally accountable for the
case. Agnew v. Bell, 4 Watts 31.
performance of the duty imposed by the
"ROBITAILLE and SHELLENBERGER for
will, and that if one of them was comthe defendant.
A voluntary payment of money on the pelled to bear the whole burden in consedebt of another can not be recovered back
quence of the inability or refusal of the
unless there is an agreement. Chamberother to bear his share of it, the former
layne's Best on Evidence, p. 618; Lackey
became entitled to contribution from the
v. Mercer, 9 Pa. 318. Mc~rickett v. City
latter.
of Pittsburg, 88 Pa. 133.
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The obligation of plaintiff and defendant in the case at bar being joint, the
plaintiff, as has been said, is entitled to
contribution. It may be urged that contribution is enforceable only by means of a
bill in equity, as it was enforced in the
case of Shillito v. Shillito. Supra. In
that case the adjustment of the dispute
involved the examination of mutual accounts, and in view of that fact the court
stated that no mistake had been made in
proceeding in equity, rather than in law.
In the case at bar there are no accounts
whatever to be examined or passed upon,
and we, therefore, doubt if a resort to
equity would be proper. But, conceding
that relief might have been obtained in
equity, it does not follow that it may not
also be obtained in law. Although the
remedy of contribution originated in
equity, it has for a long time been concurrently enforced in courts of law, by
means of the action in assumpsit. Am.
& Eng. Ency. of Law, 2nd Ed.,Vol. 7, p.
329.
Demurrer overruled.

MONDEAU vs. COUNTY OF BUCKS.
Deputy constable--State'sliabilitytopolice
for injuries.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

On the 27th day of February, 1898, Constable Atherholt, of Nockamixon, accompanied by Erwin Mondeau and Israel Moser,
whom he had sworn in as deputies, visited
the residence of Adam Weaver, for the
purpose of arresting him on a charge of
larceny and receiviug stolen goods. Some
time before this Constable Cressman, of
Springfield, had been driven away by
Weaver with a shotgun while attempting
to arrest him on the same charge. Cressman then gave up the attempt, and Atherholt was called upon to serve the warrant. One week before the above date he
and Arthur McCarty drove to Weaver's
place, but he was not at home. Then, on
February 27th, Atherholt, 'ondeau and
Moser went to the place, determined to
take him at all hazards, as he was known
to the community as a desperate character. When they were tying their horse
they saw Mrs. Weaver on the porch. She

went into the house and letthe door stand
open about four or five inches. Now, as
Atherholt rapped at the door some one
attempted to push it shut. He placed his
foot in the open space just in time to keep
it from going shut. He then forced his
way and found Weaver standing inside
with a shotgun, defying him to come
another step. He and Moser tried to induce him to give up, but of no avail. His
wife urged him on. She gave them five
minutes' time to get out of the house.
Atherholtmade ajump for Weaver, knocking the gun upward with his hand. He
raised the gun just high enough so that
the load went through his hat, and cut the
top of his head enough to make it bleed.
A terrific struggle then ensued, in which
Mondeau was killed by a shot from
Weaver's revolver, and Atherholt receiving three wounds in the head. Weaver
escaped.
Erwin Mondeau was his father. Edwin
Mondeau being his only help, and the one
upon whom he depended for support, the
father now sucs the county of Bucks for
$10,000. Can herecover?
BASEHORE and HARTMAN for the plaintiff.
S i uHand KERN for the defendant.
1. With respect to damages incurred in
carrying out dangerous commands, the
relation of a police officer to the State is
not that of servant to master. Dunbar v.
City of Boston, 112 Mas. 75; Bernard
Alger v. Caston, 119 Mass. 77.
2. There has been no breach of duty on
the part of the county alleged by the plaintiff; and, the plaintiff's son having been'
legally sworn in as a public officer, plaintiff cannot recover for damages from his
death in carrying out a dangerous duty.
Kimball v. City of Boston, 83 Mass. 417.
OPINION OF T11E COURT.

Constables are public officers, appointed
or elected to preserve the peace and to execute the processes of justices of the peace.
Patterson's Dictionary of Law, p. 236;
Reading's Constables, 8 Pa. C. C. R. 101.
Their duties are of a mixed character, a
part of them pertaining to the township,
borough or ward, and apart to the county.
Reading's Constables (supra); Brunett v.
McKee, 6 W. & S. 513. If the county be
regarded merely as a political division of
the State, it is obviously not liable for any
tort committed by its officers. And if the
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county be regarded as a municipal corporation, or a quasi-municipal corporation,
it is liable only for such 'torts as are committed in the performance of some municipal or corporate duty which is private in
its nature. For torts of its officers committed in the discharge of governmental
or political duties, it cannot be compelled
to answer. These propositions are fundamental, and are supported by a host of
authorities. See Hale on Torts, p. 108, and
Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, Vol. 19, p.
515.
The arrest of a person charged with crime
is the performance of a police duty, and, as
such, is clearly governmental. Granting,
then, that the constable was guilty of
negligence, or of wrongful conduct, and
that the injury to plaintiff is the proximate result of such negligence or wrongful
conduct, the county is not liable.
Demurrer sustained.
AMMON vs. FABER.

Surely.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

On the third of September, 1898, Ammon
leased to Josiah Oram for four years from
October 1, 1890, a house in Carlisle for the
rent of $200, payable in equal monthly
instalments of $16.66J.
"And the said
Oram shall likewise pay the taxes assessed
on the house during the term." Below
the signature of Oram to the lease, the
following was written: "In consideration
of the making of this lease to Josiah Oram,
I undertake to pay Henry Ammon the
agreed on rent, should Oram not do so."
(Signed) George Faber.
Borough tax averaging $20 was assessed
in the month of May each year.
Oran paid the rent and taxes of the first
two years, but none of the last two.
On May 11, 1899, this action of assumpsit was brought. No demand had been
made on Oram for the rent. On three
occasions Oram had regretted to Ammon
his not having paid the rent and had
promised, if Ammon would be patient, to
pay it within three weeks; Ammon had
said that he would wait. Faber had supposed that the rent was paid, and on that
assumption had paid a debt of $600 which

he owed Cram, and against which he
might have set-off the amount of rent had
he known of it and paid it to Ammon.
HENDERSON and LAVENS for the plaintiff.
1. If a person signs a stipulation in a
lease saying that he will pay the rent upon
failure of the lessee to do so, he will be
held liable as surety. Coe v. Vogdes, 71
Pa. 383; Pleasanton's Appeal, 75 Pa. 344;
Rice v. Loomis, 139 Mass. 302.
2. The landlord, before resorting to his
remedy against the surety, is not obliged
to demand the rent of the lessee or institute
proceedings to recover the same, or notify
the surety of the non-payment. Dusker
v. Rapp, 41 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 235.
COBLENTZ and FRANTZ for the defendant.
1. The lessor must, within a reasonable
time, bring suit against his lessee before
lie can sue the surety. Building Ass'n v.
Lichtenwalner, 100 Pa. 180; Gilbert v.
Hench, 30 Pa. 205; Woods v. Sherman, 71
Pa. 100; Hoffman v. Bechtel, 52 Pa. 190.
2. When a plaintiff has, by his delay,
induced or suffered the defendant to incur
expense or enter into engagements of a
burdensome character, the courts will consider that he is guilty of such laches as
preclude him from obtaining relief. Fisher
v. Knox, 13 Pa. 622; Green v. Foster, 113
Pa. 642.
3. This action is brought May 11, 1899,
for monthly rents accruing for two years
from Oct. 1, 1892. The statute of limitations (6 years) precludes recovery for the
period between Oct. 1, 1892, and May 11,
1893. 1 P. & L. 2666.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
This is an action of assumpsit brought
to recover from George Faber, the defendant, a certain sum for taxes and rent due
the plaintiff by Josiah Oram. When the
lease was made by Ammon to Oram, the
defendant entered into an agreement,
stipulating to pay "the agreed on rent
should Oram not do so." It is contended
on the part of the plaintiff that this is an
agreement of surety, and therefore, it is
not necessary to first exhaust the property
of Oram before bringing this action. The
defendant, on the contrary, insists that it
is merely a guaranty.
We think that in the case at bar Faber
made himself responsible to pay the rent
if Oram did not, and that, therefore, the
contract is one of surety, and hence it was
unnecessary for Ammon to pursue Oram
to insolvency before instituting this action.
As Agnew J. has said in Reigart v. White,
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52 Pa. 438, "the surety assumes to perform
the contract if the principal debtor should
not." while "the guarantor merely undertakes that his principal can perform, and
that he is able to do so."
Similar rulings are found in Pleasonton's
and Biddle's Appeal, 75 Pa. -344, and
Hayes v. Synnott, 160 Pa. 180.
We cannot see that the defendant has
been injured by the delay in bringing this
action, which was caused by the efforts of
Ammon to secure payment from the principal debtor, Oram.
Judgment must, therefore, be entered
for the plaintiff for the amount admitted
to be due.
HIMES vs. CURRY.
Waiver of defective .ummons -Amendment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

This is an appeal from judgment rendered against defendant by John Garrett,
J.P. 3. T. Himes and James Himes were
engaged in the milling business in Huntingdon county from 1887 to 1891, under the
firm name of "Himes Bros.," and during
the year 1890 they sold flour and feed to
the defendant to the amount of S12-5.
In 1893 a settlement of the partnership
business was made, and the book account
with the defendant was transferred to one
of the partners, J. T. Himes.
In September, 1895, J. T. Himes, the
plaintiff, brought suit before John Garrett,
J. P., to recover the amount of this bill
from the defendant (the suit being instituted in the name of J. T. Himes as plaintiff). The defendant, at the time of the
bringing of the suit, was a resident of Blair
county, while the plaintiffresided in Huntingdon county, where the suit was brought.
The justice of the peace issued a summons,
made returnable in eight days from the
date of issue, and it was duly served on
defendant while she happened to be in
Huntingdon county.
On the date of the return of the writ the
defendant and plaintiff appeared before
the justice; and, upon the evidence, judgment was entered for the plaintiff and
against the defendant for the amount of
the claim, and costs.
An appeal was then taken by the defend-

ant to the Court of Common Pleas, to No.
56, September Term, 1895.
On the trial of the case in the Court of
Common Pleas, on February 14, 1898, defendant's counsel asked the court to instruct the jury: First, "that their verdict
must be for the defendant for the reason
that the suit was brought in the name of
J. T. Himes as plaintiff, instead of in the
name of Himes Bros. for use of J. T.
Himes;" second, that their verdict must
be for the defendant for the reason that the
summons issued was irregular.
At the opening of the case the defendant
asked the court to dismiss the action, on
account of the foregoing state of facts,
contending that the court had no jurisdiction of the case, under the provisions of
the Act of July 12, 1843.
Judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of
$125.
LIGHT and COLLINS for the plaintiff.
1. The name of the legal plaintiff may
be added by amendment. Act of May 4,
1852, 2 P. & L. 36.32.
2. The appearance of the defendant before the justice of tie peace to try the case
on its merits operated as a waiver of all
defects in the process. Weidenhamer v.
Bertle, 103 Pa. 448; Fulmer v. Kinney, 5
C. C. 426; Myers v. Stauffer, 22 W. N. C.
412.
CLARK and McDONALD for the defendant.
1. This action must be dismissed, for
(a) all assignee must sue in the name of
his assignor. Harbach v. Huey, 4 Watts
455; Mosgrove v. Golden, 101 Pa. 605. (b)
While amendment, as provided for by
statute, might have been made below, the
error will not be amended in the appellate
court, but the cause will be remanded for
a new trial. Richter v. Cummings, 60 Pa.
443.
2. The justice had no jurisdiction, for
the summons was defective, not having
complied with the requirements of the
statute pertaining to residents of another
county. Act of July 12, 1842, 1 P. & L.
2561; Brennan v. Taylor, 1 W. N. C. 484;
Pantall & Davis v. Dickey, 123 Pa. 431.
CHARGE OF COURT.

The firm of "Himes Bros." sold in 1890
flour and feed, it is alleged, to Mary W.
Curry, to the amount of S125. When the
partnership was dissolved, in 1893, the account against Curry was transferred to J,
T. Himes, the plaintiff. Tile principle is
too well settled to- need discussion, that
the assignee of a claim must maintain suit
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.upon it in the name of the assignor, to
his use. The plaintiff should have been
"Himes Bros.," to use of J. T. Himes.
But, the case was heard before the justice without objection on this score He.
could and would have permitted an amendment. The case is in this court on appeal,
and it is heard de novo upon its merits.
The Act of May 4, 1852, 2 P. & L. 3632,
applies to actions pending or to be brought
in the several courts, and authorizes the
court, in any stage of the proceedings, to
permit amendments by changing or adding names of plaintiff or defendant. Adding the name of a legal plaintiff is thereunder permissible. Patton v. Railway Co.,
96 Pa. 169; Latshaw v. Hiltebeitel, 2 Penn.
263; Insurance Co. v. Scott, 1 Walk. 181.
There is no reason why this should not be
allowed, and it was in fact allowed in the
Common Pleas on an appeal from a justice's judgment-Gue v. Kline, 13 Pa. 60,
even before the passage of the Act of May
4, 1852.
The amendment is allowed.
We are asked to say to you that your
verdict must be for the defendant, because
the suit being brought in Huntingdon
county, and the defendanit a resident of
Blair county, the summons was made returnable in eight days from the date of
its issue, and was served on the defendant
while she happened to be transiently in
Huntingdon county.
The twenty-sixth section of the Act of
12th July, 1842, 1 P. & L. 2.561, directs
that, when no capias can issue, " and the
defendant shall reside out of the county,

he shall be proceeded against by summons
or attachment, returnable not less than
two nor more than four days from the date
thereof, which shall be served at least two
days before the time of appearance mentioned therein." The object, doubtless, of
this provision is to secure the defendant a
reasonably speedy hearing. Whatever its
object, it is plainly intended for his benefit
and this benefit he may waive. In Brennan v. Taylor, 1 W. N. 0. 484, Ludlow, P.
J., was apparently of opinion that although the defendant, summoned to appear in seven days from the issue of the
summons, appeared before the justice, he
could on certiorari set aside the proceedings. In Fulmer v. Kenney, 5 Pa. C. C.
426, Schuyler, P. J., decided that simply
accepting service of an eight-day summons
was not a waiver of the objection; but said
that, had he appeared and defended on the
merits, he would have waived the error.
In Weidenhamer v. Bertle, 103 Pa. 449, it
is said that the defendant's appearing and
going to trial "was a waiver of all questions relating to the return of the (five
days') summons and the time of service.
It gave the justice jurisdiction of the person." The defendant did not appear in
Pantall v. Dickey, 123 Pa. 431, and therefore the transcript was stricken off in the
Common Pleas. We are therefore not able
to instruct you as we are requested to do.
As there is no defense on the merits, your
verdict, gentlemen of the jury, if you believe the plaintiff's testimony, should be
for him.

